Hash Length Extension Attack Lab

General problem

- Some hash function constructions are iterative in the sense that they update the hash calculation result of previous parts of the document ("message") to hash.
  - They keep updating up to the last part (block) of the message.
- This feature would allow the (trivial) calculation of the hash of a composed message *M1* || *M2*[1] starting from the hash of *M1*.
  - And so forth with additional messages, *M1* || *M2* || *M3*...

1 concatenation of M1 with M2

...General problem

- A Message Integrity Code, MIC[1], based on a hash function of this type[2] and calculated as *hash* (*K* || *M*), with *K* secret, and *M* the document to protect from unauthorized modification, is vulnerable to the so called "*Hash Length Extension Attack*":
  - Forging the MIC of an extended message M || N is very easy.
- To prevent this vulnerability, hash functions with constructs of this type use a strengthening feature: the adding of a last hashing stage with *padding* bytes that include the size of the original message! That is the case of the Merkle–Damgård construction.
  - Nevertheless, even with this protection, a *Hash Length Extension Attack* is still possible!

1 synonym of Message Authentication Code, MAC
2 SHA-256 is an example of such hash!

Hash Length Extension Attack procedure

- The attacker needs to have access to the inner parts of the hash mechanism, namely:
  - for inserting the previous hash *H*(*P1*) in the internal state;
  - for updating the internal counter of message length.
  - see [FIG]

...Hash Length Extension Attack procedure